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Windsor: “Boforce”

Lee A. Windsor

S

ince the end of the Second World War the
performance of the Canadian Army and its
senior leadership in Europe has come under
increasing criticism. J o h n A. English h a s
addressed these issues in The Canadian Army
and the Normandy Campaign: A Study in the
Failure of High Command. Bill McAndrew has
also drawn attention to the failure of Canadian
units in the Italian theatre in an article for Military
Affairs entitled "Fire or Movement? Canadian
Tactical Doctrine, Sicily, 1943." These historians
have focused on operations that have had less
than completely satisfactory results in order to
demonstrate the problems with the Canadian way
of war. While this is an important exercise, it is
equally important to look at cases in which the
Canadian Army performed well. The thrust of 1st
Canadian Division to take the town of Potenza is
j u s t one of m a n y examples of s u p e r i o r
performance in the Italian Campaign.

The action at Potenza does not fit this model.
First Canadian Division was blessed with a staff
seasoned in the hills of Sicily and one of the most
able commanders Canada has ever produced,
Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds. The plan
to take Potenza was not dictated by fire. Indeed,
its key was speed and surprise, making maximum
use of the initiative of junior commanders who
rose to the occasion.

I

n the middle of September 1943, the AngloAmerican Allies were caught in a somewhat
embarrassing situation. On all fronts the Axis
forces were on the defensive. In the Pacific, the
Japanese were being driven out of their only
recently won empire by the "island hopping"
forces of the United States. In the Soviet Union,
the Germans had suffered a disastrous defeat at
Stalingrad; their last hope of victory was now
English and McAndrew argue that Canadian
gone. The combined armies of Germany and Italy
o p e r a t i o n s o v e r - e m p h a s i z e d firepower,
had been surrounded and captured in Tunis.
particularly artillery. "The most serious result
Sicily had fallen as the stepping stone to
continental Europe, to be followed closely by the
seems to have been a loss of flexibility - of mind
landing of Allied troops on mainland Italy,
as well as m o v e m e n t - which limited
bringing the final collapse of the Italian war
o p p o r t u n i t i e s for exploring u n e x p e c t e d
machine. It was in southern Italy that the Allied
openings." 1 Strict adherence to elaborate
run of good fortune seemed as though it might
fireplans restricted the freedom of manoeuvre
abruptly stop. Four days after the landing at
available to battalion commanders. English also
Salerno on 9 September 1943, in the "ankle" of
stresses poor leadership and shoddy staff work
the Italian peninsula, the Anglo-American Fifth
as leading causes of Canadian ineffectiveness as
Army was considering withdrawal in the face of
the subtitle of his book, A Study of Failure in
2
heavy German counterattacks. "The Germans
High Command, suggests.
outmatched the Allied build-up and soon pinned
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5th Army down on the floor of the great
amphitheatre-like plain of the Sele River."3
Highly effective air strikes and particularly naval
gunfire helped to avoid disaster, but the most
direct means of relieving the pressure on the
beachhead would be to speed up the advance of
Eighth Army.4 However, its progress up the
Calabrian peninsula was proceeding more slowly
than had been hoped, due to the extensive
demolitions carried out by German engineers
along the already poor road network. Allied
engineers were the key to speeding up this drive,
but their task was exceedingly difficult due to the
shortage of bridging equipment, fuel and other
vital stores. 5 The limited sealift available in the
Mediterranean had to be concentrated to buildup the beleaguered Fifth Army.
This period of crisis gave birth to "Boforce,"
an all-arms combat team which was named for
its leader, Lieutenant-Colonel M.P. "Pat" Bogert
of the West Nova Scotia Regiment. Their task
was to race over 125 miles of winding road to
Potenza, in the rear of the main German positions
at Salerno, in an effort to assist the embattled
Fifth Army.
While the mission was still in the planning stage
the Salerno situation improved. By 16 September,
the German Tenth Army had begun a phased
withdrawal. Thus "Boforce's" task would change; it
would pursue the retreating Germans to prevent
them from catching their breath long enough to
turn and make another stand. While the Salerno
beachhead was no longer in serious jeopardy and
the Germans were withdrawing, "a quick stride
forward by Montgomery's forces would undoubtedly
hasten the process."6
It was the German intention that by the night
of 21-22 September the Corps [76th Panzer]
should have reached a line extending from
Salerno through Potenza to Altamura.7

The German left would then continue to fall back
to a second line just in front of the Foggia Plain
which was to be held at least until 30 September.
The question was, as G. W.L. Nicholson points out
in the Canadian Army official history, whether or
not that plan could be accelerated or disrupted. 8
"Boforce" had been the idea of Major-General
Guy Simonds, commanding 1st Canadian
Division, based on his experience using similar

Lieutenent-Colonel M.P. "Pat" Bogert, CO of the West
Nova
Scotia
Regiment,
(holding
map
board)
discussing the action at Potenza with Mqjor-General
Guy Simonds, GOC 1st Canadian Infantry Division.
(NAC PA 193388)

"flying columns" in the Italian foot since the
landing at Reggio. The fully motorized Potenza
force would possess the elements of speed and
substantial firepower, thus making a rapid
approach possible, yet with enough strength to
take on considerable opposition. This was not
the type of operation Montgomery was fond of,
compared to his set piece battles in North Africa
and Sicily; indeed he referred to Simonds' plan
as an "administrative risk," but given the
logistical situation and the urgent need to link
all Allied forces in a single front across southern
Italy, it appeared to be the only possible solution.9
Simonds envisioned a flying column in the
advance to Potenza as the vanguard for what was,
in effect, a divisional operation. Boforce would
be drawn from Howard Penhale's 3rd Brigade,
the remainder of which would follow as closely
as possible. The other two brigades in the division
would not be far behind either. "Boforce," was
the largest such team yet assembled by the
Canadian Army. In addition to the West Nova
Scotia Regiment's infantrymen, the Calgary
Regiment (14th CTR) would furnish "A" Squadron
as the armoured component. The Royal Canadian
Artillery would also contribute substantially to
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"Boforce" with "C" Battery of the 1st Battalion,
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, and two troops
from the 1st Anti-tank Regiment. The divisional
support battalion, the Saskatoon Light Infantry,
provided a platoon of Vickers medium machineguns. Three Platoon of the 1st Field Company
made up the engineer detachment. "A" Company
of the 9th Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian
Army Medical Corps, completed the force."10 Air
power was not considered in the operational
planning as air resources on both sides were
concentrated at Salerno. As a precaution
however, "C" Troop, 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft
Battery, was included in the column.
Late in the morning of 17 September, Major General Simonds met with Bogert to give a final
briefing, following which, at 1230 hours, "Boforce"
set out up the coast road. Just what Bogert and
his troops would do if they contacted the enemy
was not known, as it was difficult to plan in advance
for any action when intelligence on enemy activity
was weak and the "only maps available were small
scale [1:250 000] things made from old Italian
surveys, with little detail of the heights and
contours."11 Once on the move, situations would
have to be dealt with as they arose.
That first day of the advance was quite
uneventful; the first leg of the route had already
been reconnoitred by a smaller column consisting
of the Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards as well
as one company of the Carleton and York
Regiment. The soldiers of "Boforce" instead had
the opportunity to enjoy the drive along the scenic
coastal highway, although many were no doubt
more concerned about when the German Army
would stand and fight.

Top: A Calgary Sherman recovers a bogged down
armoured car near one of the demolished bridges
on the road to Potenza.
(NAC PA 144114)
Above: "D" Company, West Nova Scotia Regiment
works to make Corleto's streets passable for tanks
while "B" Company advances on foot.
(NAC PA 193389)
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On the morning of 18 September, "Boforce"
passed through the forward Canadian positions
near San Arcangelo and continued on towards
Corleto until it came to an abrupt stop, 2600 meters
south of the town.12 It was time for the engineers to
go to work as the bridge over a small river bed had
been blown, the first in a series of such delays. The
sappers began working on a diversion, but the
vehicles would be unable to go on past Corleto
anyway as its streets were choked with the rubble
created by Allied bombing. "D" Company was
immediately set to the task of clearing a path
through the rubble. Meanwhile, an engineer
reconnaissance detachment continued forward with
Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert, part of his command
group, and "B" Company.13
4
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During the remainder of 18 September and
early the next day several more demolitions were
encountered, but the enemy remained elusive. Later,
on the morning of 19 September, the infantrymen of
"A" Company rounded the bend in the road near the
Camastra River bridge, south of Anzi, just in time to
watch it blast apart. The German sappers who had
just carried out the demolition, noticed their audience
and opened fire. The West Novas scattered for cover
and immediately returned small arms fire with their
.303 Enfield rifles and Bren guns. Not everyone made
it safely to cover; a vital member of the "Boforce"
team. Captain Buchanan, the artillery forward
observation officer (FOO), was slightly wounded in
the exchange of fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert
planned a hasty attack, utilizing the battalion's threeinch mortar platoon, under Lieutenant R. W. Bullock,
to assist in laying down a base of fire, while "A"
Company provided the assault element. The brief
engagement was reminiscent of the German delaying
tactics encountered by Canadian units in the early
stages of the Sicilian Campaign, for as soon as
Bullock's mortarmen started lobbing shells and "A"
Company deployed for the attack, the Germans broke
contact and withdrew. No other known casualties
were taken by either side with the exception of a
German lorry left burning near the destroyed bridge.14
The newly formed obstacle was easily bypassed
and by this time the heavy vehicles had caught up,
so once again, the armour took up the lead, with the
adrenaline-charged soldiers of "A" Company riding
on top. The last town that would be passed through
before reaching Potenza was Anzi, with 17 miles
separating them. The leading tanks found another
destroyed bridge just outside of Anzi at about midday
on 19 September, but a diversion was easily
constructed and once again the troops pushed on.
In the town itself, contact was made with more
German sappers who had been sowing Teller mines
in the road, only this time it was the gunner of the
lead Sherman who was the quickest on the draw.15
Several 75-millimetre shells were hurled at three
German lorries which promptly collected their
passengers and scuttled off. "Thus hustled, the
enemy had no time for elaborate demolitions or
properly to conceal the mines, "16 which, left unburied,
were easily dealt with by the Canadian engineers,
and "Boforce" continued on. Only a short time after
sundown, at 1930 hours, 19 September, the force
had reached the high ground overlooking the
Basento River valley, and the town of Potenza.
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A Jeep Ambulance of 9 Field Ambulance passes the
wreck of a German lorry knocked out by West Nova
mortar fire south of Anzi after a German engineer
detail was caught in the act of blowing a bridge.
(NAC PA 193390)

The town itself represented a formidable
obstacle, being situated in a dominating
position part way up the northern slope of the
valley, commanding excellent fields of fire and
observation. The town was full of concrete
apartment blocks and rubble choked streets
created by the Allied bombing which would
further favour the defender by preventing, or
at least hindering the employment of armour
in support of an infantry assault. 17
It had already been dark for some time when
Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert arrived on the heights
overlooking Potenza, thus it was impossible to
conduct a thorough reconnaissance or take
advantage of his excellent observation point.
Instead, the tactical plan had to be formulated
almost entirely from maps, never a favourable
option, made worse by the poor quality of Italian
charts. Another negative factor in the plan of
attack was the lack of hard intelligence on enemy
strength in the area.18
Consequently, Bogert h a d very little
concrete information on which to base his plan,
making the initial attack a reconnaissance in
itself. Bogert originally planned to launch his
attack at dawn so that the West Novas could
be properly supported by artillery, but this was
not to be. In order to offset the German
55
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"Adjunct" of "A" Squadron, The Calgary Regiment, overlooking Potenza. In the centre of the photo can be
seen the railyard where the lead companies came under heavy fire. The bridges over the dry bed of the
Basento can also be seen. 20 September 1943.
(NAC PA 144103)

a d v a n t a g e s of observation, which could
potentially serve to annihilate a daylight
assault, General Simonds ordered "Boforce" to
make a grab for the town that very night. 19
This attack was to begin an hour after the
moon rose at 2300 hours. The rifle companies
would make their approach into the valley in
motor transport and dismount near the first of
a series of three bridges which carried the main
road a c r o s s the B a s e n t o a n d two other
connecting creeks. 20 At this time of year the
watercourses were all dry and easily negotiated
by infantry, but reconnaissance patrols had
discovered that the first of the bridges had been

blown and the surrounding area had been
mined, including the dry river bed. 21 This new
information was factored into the plan which
would now see "D" Company move into a
position from where it could cover a sapper
detail that would clear a path through the
mines. Following the completion of the breach,
"D" and "C" Companies would advance towards
the town. "A" Company would move up to cover
the engineers, who would continue working to
widen the minefield breach and to construct a
vehicle diversion around the blown bridge so
that the armour could push through to support
the leading platoons. "B" Company would serve
as the tactical reserve. 22
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It appears that no artillery fire plan was
prepared to support the attack, although a Forward
Observation Officer would go along with the leading
companies.23 This, however, is not so unusual
considering the absence of daylight to observe the
ground over which the troops had to advance,
coupled with the poor maps. It was also not
customary to prepare such a plan until contact had
been made with the enemy and the appropriate
intelligence gathered regarding their positions. Once
this had been done, the fire plan would take time to
put together; in the case of the Liri Valley battle,
later in the campaign, the plan took three days to
complete.24 Neither the information nor the time
was available for such detailed artillery support of
the first attack at Potenza.
At 0100 hours, 20 September the infantry and
engineers moved down into the valley. "C," "D" and
"A" Companies, the sappers, and a platoon of "B"
Company, drove down towards the area of the first
bridge, sacrificing the stealth of a foot-borne
approach for the speed of their lorries. While the
soldiers were dismounting, an "A" Company lorry
struck a Teller mine, ripping through the cab,
wounding seven of the occupants. Three more of
the attached "B" Company soldiers were injured
when their vehicle ran into the crater of another
mine.25 Ten men were out of action, surprise was
lost and not a shot had yet been fired; some of the
most decisive factors in war are those which are
not expected.
At 0300 hours the sudden roar of small arms
fire broke the early morning calm as an "A"
Company patrol chased off another German
demolition detail as it was attempting to blow the
second bridge. 26 In the meantime, after the
engineers had cleared the way, "C" and "D"
Companies crossed the dry river bed and deployed
for their advance into the town. It was nearly dawn
as the point rifle sections climbed the steep
embankment up to the railyard only to face a wall
of flying steel. As the daylight grew, the plight of
the lead companies became apparent. The German
defenders, members of the crack 1st Parachute
Division, had quite successfully isolated "C" and
"D" companies from the remainder of the regiment.
They did so by pinning those companies down with
automatic weapons and at least one towed antitank gun, while at the same time pouring fire down
in the vicinity of the river bed, preventing the
crossing of "A" and "B" Companies. The armour
could not yet cross either, as it was held up by the
blown bridge and accompanying mines. The best

that could be done to support the lead companies
at this point was to provide suppressive fire in an
attempt to neutralize some of the German positions,
but this had to be done with extreme caution as it
was unclear exactly how far the forward platoons
had penetrated.27 The fire of the artillery, 3-inch
mortars, and medium machine guns was used
largely in a harassment role; firing on targets of
opportunity or being adjusted by radio and runner.28
The increasing daylight also brought German
small arms fire down around the engineers working
at the first bridge. Their task was further
compounded by the thoroughness of their German
counterparts, who had booby-trapped many of the
mines with anti-lifting devices.29 Two 6-pounder
anti-tank guns, as well as a troop of the heavier 17pounder guns of the 57th Anti-Tank Battery, were
deployed near the first bridge and immediately
began firing on the weapons signatures of the
German machine guns that were harassing the
sappers.30 Yet it would still take some time to clear
a safe approach on this axis of advance for infantry
or armour. In the meantime, Bogert put the Calgary
Tanks to use as mobile artillery, the direct fire of
their flat trajectory, 75 mm guns being more easily
applied to support the infantry, fighting in the close
confines of the town, than the indirect fire of the
artillery's field guns.31 The gunners instead went
to work pummelling the main German position
further up the northern slope where the destructive
bursts of the 25-pounder shells would not pose a
threat to the West Novas.
The advance of "Boforce" had been much more
rapid than the German staff officers had planned
for, and only a scratch force of paratroops had been
rushed to Potenza from the Salerno sector at the
last minute. One company-sized mixed group,
heavy on machine-guns, and complete with an antitank detachment, had reached the town by the
afternoon of 19 September.32 The paratroopers were
to have been only the vanguard for a larger force
tasked with holding the town in accordance with
the phased withdrawal, but instead they fought
alone and unsupported by artillery. The veteran
German soldiers used what little time they had
before the Canadians were upon them, to skilfully
position their machine guns with such effective
inter-locking fields of fire that, until the Canadian
tanks crossed the river bed, any further frontal
assault, while possible, would be bloody.
This was readily apparent from LieutenantColonel Bogert's h e a d q u a r t e r s . Brigadier
57
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Penhale, under the watchful eye of MajorGeneral Simonds, both of whom had arrived
sometime in the mid-morning, put together a
plan of attack utilizing the entire 3rd Brigade.
To begin with, the 4th Field Company of the
Royal Canadian Engineers was brought up to
assist the 1st Field Company sappers still
working at clearing a crossing near the first
bridge, so that the tanks could get forward to

perfect. The Vandoos moved off from their
startline at 1230 hours, five miles east of
Potenza, b u t still in view of the German
paratroopers. This advance began just as the
sappers were completing their work at the
bridge site allowing the armour to finally get
into the fight directly. With their position being
outflanked, and only limited a n t i - t a n k
capability to deal with the armoured threat in

Left. A Medium Machine Gun of the Saskatoon Light Infantry
harasses
German paratroopers defending
Potenza.
(NAC PA 189888) Right: A Canadian army photographer lights the cigarette of an Italian civilian
who hid a downed American airman in his home near Potenza. (NAC PA 193391)

support "D" and "C" Companies.33 The principal
effort would be shifted to the east where the
Royal 22e Regiment, which arrived during the
night, would carry out a wide flanking
movement on the Canadian right, to seize the
heights behind the town.34 Such an attack over
relatively open ground would be more easily
supported by artillery. The fire of all three
batteries of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery's
1st Field Regiment was to assist the Vandoos'
attack. 35 The Carleton and York Regiment was
in reserve. 36
The plan was not set into motion until
shortly after noon, but either by design or by
chance the timing could not have been more

front, the Germans faced two options: fight on
and be annihilated or withdraw to fight another
day. The latter choice was apparently planned
for as the German motor transport awaited the
retreating defenders on the other side of a
railway tunnel which cut through the high
ground to the northeast. 37
The bulk of the Germans escaped through
the tunnel but several snipers were left in the
town to be mopped up by the West Novas. The
remainder of the armour, along with two
platoons of "B" Company riding on top and
Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert in his command jeep,
pushed up the main road into Potenza. The
officer in command of the Calgary t a n k
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squadron was rather reluctant to proceed forward
due to the threat p o s e d by the German antitank guns. Bogert informed the tank officer that
he intended to drive into the town in his jeep
and he expected the tanks to accompany him.38
After consolidating the town and dispatching
patrols to make contact with flanking Allied units,
this stage of 1st Canadian Division's operations
was complete and the two Allied armies were
linked in a continuous front from Bari to Salerno.
Canadian casualties for this comparatively smallscale operation were "light," six killed and a
further 21 wounded. Casualties among the
German paratroopers are unknown, although 16
prisoners were left behind, mostly wounded.39
The cost of war in Potenza was further magnified
by the civilian death toll resulting from the Allied
bombing, estimates of which ran as high as
2,000, the corpses still rotting in the sun as the
Canadians entered the town.40
The Canadian objective of accelerating the
G e r m a n withdrawal program had been
accomplished. The unexpectedly rapid advance
by "Boforce" to Potenza was a key factor in the
German line retreating ahead of its intended
schedule. On 1 October, Eighth Army had
penetrated 20 miles beyond the notional German
defence line in front of Foggia, which was to have
become operational just at that time. In spite of
these dramatic strides forward the situation was
stabilized by mid-October, and the opportunities
for further substantial exploitation on the Adriatic
front had dried up. This stalling of Eighth Army's
advance was the direct result of the same
logistical problems that had plagued it since
landing at Reggio.41
A q u e s t i o n emerges from this r a t h e r
simplistic explanation: Why was the German
army, usually so meticulous in operational staff
work, so badly mistaken as to the rate of the
Canadian advance? The question is a complex
one, and it hinges on the fact that the use of
fast, mobile, all arms columns was a departure
from the operational norms of the Canadian and
British armies developed in the close country of
Sicily and Italy.42 It cannot be stated for certain,
but it is probable that the German plan for a
phased withdrawal, initiated on 18 September,
was based on their perception of standard British
operational methods, which were seen as rather
slow and ponderous, each new step forward being
launched from a consolidated base, and only after
large stocks of supplies had been brought to
forward dumps to sustain the drive. The Potenza

mission began without the customary large
supply base, and proceeded up a narrow road
axis with relatively open flanks, in order to strike
deep into the thinly held enemy left. The move
was not typically Montgomery, but then again,
"Boforce" was not Montgomery's idea.43
The spectacular success of "Boforce" went
unknown for some time to other Canadians back
in England and at home, anxious for news about
the only Canadian ground troops active in any
theatre at that time. No reports could be released
because "it was essential that the enemy should
not realize that a single infantry division was
covering the whole wide front from west of
Potenza to the vicinity of Taranto."44
Even in the years after the war, in comparison
to the larger, and bloodier, Italian battles like
Ortona and the Hitler Line, the small action at
Potenza would not get much attention. Yet the
absence of heavy fighting and huge casualty lists
is exactly what made "Boforce" so successful, for
the speed and surprise with which the team
descended upon the town were the keys to its
victory.
The battle does sit at the centre of the
controversy regarding whether Eighth Army
could have advanced faster out of Calabria, to
support Fifth Army in its crisis at Salerno. In
this context, some historians and strategists,
mostly American, have judged that Eighth Army
operations conducted during those crucial days
in September were insignificant. This may in
fact be true, yet when the Canadian drive to
Potenza is considered as part of the effort to
hasten the German forces withdrawing from the
Salerno area, and to seize the Foggia airfields,
then it can only be judged as a great achievement.
William McAndrew points out in "Fire or
Movement?" that Simonds' had outlined his
offensive method in a 1939 article for the
Canadian Defence Quarterly. In "The Attack"
Simond's identified two types of defensive action.
In one, the defender attempts to deny information
to the attacker. "The action required of the
infantry will necessitate tactics of manoeuvre and
infiltration through close country, not an attack
with a set fire plan." The other type of action
finds the defender in prepared positions which
must be breached in a set-piece assault. 45 Given
that the Germans originally intended to hold
Potenza in some strength, Boforce does not fit
into either model.
59
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The plan was the result of a necessity for
rapid advance, combined with limitations of
strained logistics and limited intelligence on the
enemy's intentions. "Boforce's" success derived
partly from the German underestimation of the
speed and initiative of the troops facing them
as well as strong Canadian leadership at the
operational and tactical levels. Simonds' flexible
plan was well executed by Bogert who pushed
relentlessly forward yet always under the
umbrella of his 25-pounders. Once engaged,
Bogert effectively employed of all available direct
and indirect-fire weapons. The operation was
daring but not foolhardy. Canadians can take
pride in the accomplishment of their fathers at
Potenza, yet it is but one example. If historians
are to assess the performance of the Canadian
Army in battle, then they must examine its
success in just as much detail as its failure.
In Memory of Jim Stokesbury, my teacher and
my friend.
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